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LIST OF PARTIES 
The plaintiffs-appellants are Yvonne Lorraine Carrillo Taylor, Patricia Ann 
Carrillo Davis and Alexander James Carrillo (collectively "Appellants"). 
The defendants-appellees are Admiral Home Loan, a California Corporation, dba 
Admiral Mortgage Company ("Admiral") and Ocwen Federal Bank, FSB ("Ocwen") 
(collectively "Appellees"). 
Lydia Inez Carrillo Epley ("Epley") and John Reisser ("Reisser") are listed on the 
caption herein as defendants-appellees, but have filed no pleadings in this case and 
otherwise have had no active involvement in this case for approximately five years. 
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STATEMENT OF JURISDICTION 
This Court has jurisdiction over this matter pursuant to Utah Code Ann. §§ 78-2-
2(3)0) and 78-2-2(4) (2001). 
STATEMENT OF ISSUES AND STANDARD OF REVIEW 
Pursuant to Rule 24(b)(1) of the Utah Rules of Appellate Procedure, Appellees 
Admiral and Ocwen submit their own statement of the issues on appeal. Appellees do 
not cite to the record showing how each issue was preserved on appeal, as this is 
Appellants' duty. 
Issues 
1. Whether Appellants' appeal should be dismissed for their failure to show 
how the issues raised in their appeal were preserved in the trial court? 
2. Whether the trial court erred in awarding summary judgment in favor of 
Admiral and Ocwen based, in part, upon the election of remedies doctrine and issuing an 
order of sale and decree of foreclosure of the subject property on the ground that 
Appellants waived their right to contest the validity of the deed of trust executed by 
Epley by obtaining and collecting a judgment against Epley? 
3. Whether the trial court erred in affirming the December 15,1998 Order and 
ruling Appellants' claims for the return of the property were moot, when Appellants: 
a. failed to post a supersedeas bond and or obtain a stay of execution of 
the December 15,1998 Order; 
b. allowed the sheriff's sale to take place as scheduled; 
c. made no attempt to redeem the subject property before the expiration 
of the six-month redemption period; 
d. purposefully failed and refused to notice up their motions relating to 
the December 15,1998 order and foreclosure sale and; 
e. allowed the subject property to be sold to a bona fide purchaser? 
4. Whether the sheriff's sale held pursuant to Rule 69 of the Utah Rules of 
Civil Procedure extinguished all rights and interests of Appellants in and to the subject 
property? 
5. Whether Appellants' participation and acquiescence in Epley's forging of 
her deceased father's name to a quit-claim deed prevent Appellants from benefiting from 
such forgery? 
Standard of Review 
This is an appeal from a trial court order awarding summary judgment in Admiral 
and Ocwen's favor and denying summary judgment for Appellants. This is also an 
appeal from subsequent refusals of the trial court to alter, annend, or clarify the terms of 
the order awarding summary judgment in Admiral and Ocwen's favor and denying 
summary judgment for Appellants. 
Upon review of a grant of a motion for summary judgment, the appellate court 
reviews the trial court's rulings for correctness, affording no deference to the trial court. 
See In re Estate of West, 948 P.2d 351, 353 (Utah 1997). The appellate court considers 
only whether the trial court correctly applied the law and correctly concluded that no 
disputed issues of material fact existed. See Sittner v. Schriever, 2001 UT App 99,418 
Utah Adv. Rep. 15, f7; Kessler v. Mortenson, 2000 UT 95,410 Utah Adv. Rep. 3, \5. 
DETERMINATIVE CONSTITUTIONAL AND 
STATUTORY PROVISIONS 
There are no determinative constitutional and statutory provisions applicable to 
this appeal. 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
Nature of the Case and Course of Proceedings 
On June 1,1995, Admiral loaned $55,000 to Defendant Epley secured by a first 
deed of trust against a Provo, Utah residence. Admiral then sold the note and deed of 
trust to Ocwen. Appellants are relatives of Epley and brought this litigation against 
Epley, her friend Reisser, and Admiral. In their Complaint, Appellants claimed title to 
the Provo, Utah property as heirs of their father's estate. Appellants further claimed 
Epley improperly granted the deed of trust to Admiral because she allegedly obtained 
title to the property by forging her deceased father's name to a prior quit-claim deed. 
Appellants now challenge the deed of trust's validity and enforceability. 
Shortly after obtaining the loan, Epley defaulted for failure to make monthly 
payments and pay property taxes, and Admiral filed a crossclaim seeking judicial 
foreclosure of the deed of trust. Ocwen was substituted in as the holder of the note and 
beneficial interest under the deed of trust and brought a motion for summary judgment 
for the full amount owed under the note and for foreclosure of the deed of trust. 
Appellants objected to Ocwen's motion and filed a cross motion for summary judgment. 
Before a ruling on the motions, Admiral and Ocwen learned through discovery 
that Appellants had obtained a default judgment against Epley for the loss of the property 
and had collected substantial sums of money from Epley on the judgment. Ocwen and 
Admiral also learned that Appellants had participated in and acquiesced to the very acts 
of forgery Appellants complained of. Based upon this new information, Admiral and 
Ocwen amended their Answer, Cross-Claim and Counterclaim and filed a second motion 
for summary judgment based upon the election of remedies doctrine. Determining the 
deed of trust executed by Epley to be a valid and enforceable first lien against the 
property, on December 15,1998, the trial court granted Admiral and Ocwen's motion and 
entered a decree of foreclosure and order for sale of the property. 
Shortly before the sheriffs sale, Appellants filed three motions with the trial court. 
Appellants specifically asked the trial court for an order clarifying the December 15, 
1998 Order, altering or amending the December 15,1998 Order, or in the alternative, 
certifying the December 15,1998 Order for immediate appeal Having the ability and 
wherewithal to notice up these motions, Appellants purposefully failed and refused to 
timely submit them for hearing before the sheriffs sale held on February 10,1999. 
On August 10,1999, the date that the six-month statutory redemption period 
expired, Appellants filed a fourth motion, this time seeking to set aside the foreclosure 
sale, or in the alternative, to enlarge the redemption period. Appellants then waited until 
ten months after the sheriffs sale to notice up this motion and the three motions 
previously filed. Appellants later withdrew their request for hearing. Ocwen requested 
Appellants' motions be noticed up for ruling by the trial court. Although it was Ocwen's 
position the motions had been rendered moot by the sheriff's sale and the expiration of 
the statutory redemption period, Ocwen requested the hearing to bring finality to the case. 
Appellants objected to the request for hearing on their own motions and a hearing was 
never scheduled. 
Nearly a year later and twenty months after the sheriffs sale, Ocwen attempted for 
a second time to notice up Appellants' motions and a hearing was finally held on 
December 13, 2001. During the hearing the trial court unequivocally denied all of 
Appellants' motions, ruling that the sheriff's sale was valid and enforceable and that the 
redemption period had expired long ago. This ruling was incorporated into the trial 
court's order dated January 16,2001. On February 15, 2001, Appellants filed their notice 
of appeal from the January 16,2001 Order. 
Statement of the Facts 
1. On June 1,1995, Admiral loaned $55,000 to Epley. (R. at 434.) 
2. The loan was evidenced by a promissory note dated June 1,1995 executed 
by Epley in favor of Admiral (the "Note"). 
3. The Note was secured by a first deed of trust (the "Trust Deed") against 
certain real property and the improvements thereon located at approximately 42 South 
700 West, Provo, Utah County, Utah, more particularly described as: 
Commencing 150.14 feet South of the Northeast corner of Block 59, Plat 
"A", Provo City Survey of Building Lots; thence West 6 rods; thence South 
3 rods, more or less to the South line of Lot 7, Block 59; thence East along 
said South line 6 rods to Southeast corner of said Lot 7; thence North 3 
rods, more or less to beginning. 
(the "Property"). (R. at 433-34.) 
4. On June 5, 1995, only four days after the loan memorialized by the Note 
was made, Admiral sold the Note and Trust Deed to Ocwen. (R. at 266,433.) 
5. Ocwen purchased pools of loans from Admiral and other lenders and 
recorded the assignments after a block or group of loans had been purchased. Consistent 
with this practice the Note Allonge and Assignment of the Deed of Trust were recorded 
in the official records of Utah County on November 9,1995. (R. at 433.) 
6. Fidelity National Title Insurance Company insured the Trust Deed on June 
8,1995, as a valid and perfected first lien and encumbrance against the Property. (R. at 
433.) 
7. According to the official records of Utah County, at the time Epley 
executed the Note and Trust Deed against the Property, Epley was the record fee simple 
owner of the Property. (R. at 432,440.) 
8. Specifically, the chain of title to the Property at the time Epley executed the 
Note and Trust Deed against the Property reflected the following: 
a. Recordation on May 31, 1994, of a Quit-Claim Deed dated August 
17,1993, naming Clarence G. Carrillo, as grantor, in favor of Clarence G. 
Carrillo, Trustee, and the Successor Trustees of the Clarence G. Carrillo 
Trust dated August 17,1993, as grantees, (R. at 438.); 
b. Recordation on May 11,1995, of a Quit-Claim Deed dated May 11, 
1995, naming Lydia Inez Carrillo Epley, Successor Trustee of The Clarence 
G. Carrillo Trust dated August 17,1993, as grantor, in favor of Lydia Inez 
Carrillo Epley, as grantee, (R. at 437.); and 
c. Recordation on June 8, 1995, of a Quit-Claim Deed dated June 2, 
1995, naming Lydia Inez Carrillo Epley, as grantor, in favor of Lydia I. 
Epley, as grantee (R. at 431.) 
(collectively the "Quit-Claim Deeds"). 
9. At the time Ocwen acquired the Note and Trust Deed from Admiral, 
Admiral and Ocwen had no notice of any claim or dispute concerning Epley's ownership 
of the Property or any issue concerning the validity or enforceability of the Trust Deed. 
(R. at 432.) 
10. On July 27,1995, approximately two months after the Note and Trust Deed 
were executed, Appellants Yvonne Loraine Carrillo Taylor, Patricia Ann Carrillo Davis, 
and Alexander James Carrillo brought this action against their sister Epley, her friend 
Reisser, and Admiral. Ocwen was later joined as a defendant. (R. at 1-15.) 
11. In their Complaint, Appellants claimed title to the Property as heirs of their 
father's estate. Appellants further claimed Epley improperly granted the Trust Deed to 
Admiral through forgery of her deceased father's name to the Quit-Claim Deeds. (R. at 
1-15.) 
12. In conjunction with the lawsuit, approximately three months after the Note 
and Trust Deed were executed, on September 19,1995, Appellants filed a lis pendens 
against the Property. 
13. On May 28,1996, default judgment was entered against Reisser and in 
favor of Appellants in an amount totaling $60,029.55, which included $55,000 principal, 
$4,852.05 accrued interest, and $177.00 costs, amounts directly related to the Note and 
Trust Deed. (R. at 171-73.) 
14. On July 3,1996, default judgment was entered against Epley in favor of 
Appellants in an amount totaling $81,079.83, which included $55,000 principal, 
$4,852.05 accrued interest, $527.78 accrued costs, and $5,700 attorneys' fees, amounts 
directly related to the Note and Trust Deed. This judgment also included $15,000 for 
punitive damages. (R. at 187-95.) 
15. Both default judgments, which were prepared by Appellants' counsel, 
treated the Trust Deed as voidable and awarded money damages to Appellants for the 
loss of the Property in amounts directly related to the amount evidenced by the Note and 
secured by the Trust Deed. Neither judgment declared the Trust Deed to be null, void or 
without force or effect. (R. at 171-73 and 187-95.) 
16. Shortly after executing the Note, Epley defaulted by failing to make the 
payments owing thereunder on November 1,1995, and on the first day of each month 
thereafter. Epley further defaulted on the Note by failing to pay the 1995 and 1996 taxes 
assessed against the Property. (R. at 432.) 
17. As a result of Epley's defaults, Ocwen accelerated the indebtedness and 
declared the entire amount of the Note, including principal and accrued interest, to be due 
and payable. (R. at 431.) 
18. Additionally, Ocwen filed a motion for summary judgment seeking 
judgment against Epley for the entire amount owing under the Note; judgment declaring 
the Deed of Trust executed by Epley to be a valid and enforceable first lien against the 
Property; and judicial foreclosure of the Property barring Appellants and Epley from any 
right, title, interest, lien, or estate in and to the Property, or any part thereof. (R. at 388-
408.) 
19. Appellants objected to Ocwen's motion and filed a cross motion for 
summary judgment seeking to have the Trust Deed declared a forgery and to be null, 
void, and without force or effect. (R. at 443-47.) 
20. Before a ruling on the motions, counsel for Ocwen took the deposition of 
Epley. During the deposition, Ocwen and Admiral learned that Appellants had collected 
substantial sums of money from Epley on the default judgment entered against her for 
loss of the Property. (R. at 697-703,706-15; Epley Dep. at 43:24-44:19; 120:17-132:15; 
147:20-148:16, which is attached hereto as an addendum.) Specifically, Ocwen and 
Admiral learned that: 
a. Appellants had garnished the wages of Epley at the rate of $208.00 
per paycheck and had collected more than $5,383.39 towards their 
judgment and possibly $20,000 with continuing garnishments. In fact, 
garnishment papers total approximately half of the court pleadings filed in 
this matter with the trial court. (R. at 702, 708-09,714; Epley Dep. at 
147:20-148:16.) 
b. Appellants and Epley had agreed that Appellant Alexander James 
Carrillo, who was living in the home on the Property, would pay $125 per 
month as rental to each of the others, but Alexander James Carrillo had not 
paid such rental to Epley. As of August 1997, Epley was owed at least 
$3,250 in past rental and possibly more. (R. at 702,710-11,714; Epley 
Dep. at 43:24-44:19.) 
c. Appellants had required Epley to convey to them by quit-claim deed 
her interest in the Property. Based upon an appraisal of the Property on 
May 25,1995, and inflationary increases since then, Epley's interest in the 
Property was worth more than $25,000. (R. at 702, 706, 714.) 
21. During Epley's deposition Ocwen and Admiral further learned that 
Appellants participated in and acquiesced to Epley's forging of their deceased father's 
name to a quit-claim deed. (R. at 838,1445, p. 4.); (Epley Dep. at 120:17-132:15.) 
22. Based upon the new information learned in Epley's deposition, on March 
30,1998, Admiral and Ocwen amended their Answer, Cross-Claim and Counterclaim, 
and on May 8,1998, filed a second motion for summary judgment based upon the 
election of remedies doctrine. (R. at 833-42 and 859-85.) 
23. On September 29, 1998 and November 16,1998 respectively, the trial court 
issued two Memorandum Decisions granting Admiral and Ocwen's Motions for 
Summary Judgment based upon the election of remedies doctrine and denying all other 
pending motions. (R. at 959-64 and 1016-19.) 
24. These Memorandum Decisions were incorporated into two orders entered 
by the trial court. First, the Judgment, Decree of Foreclosure and Order of Sale entered 
by the trial court on December 14,1998, that determined the Trust Deed executed by 
Epley was a valid and enforceable first lien against the Property and ordered a decree of 
foreclosure and sale of the Property (R. at 1033-38.) The trial court entered a second 
order entitled Order Granting Defendants' Motion for Summary Judgment and Denying 
Plaintiffs' Motion for Summary Judgment on December 15,1998. (R. at 1039-42.) 
25. A sheriff's sale of the Property was scheduled for February 10,1999. 
26. On December 24,1998, in an apparent effort to stop the sheriff's sale, 
Appellants filed three motions with the trial court. (R. at 1043-45.) Appellants 
specifically asked the trial court: 
a. For an order clarifying its December 15,1998 Order, or in the 
alternative, for an order determining the percentage interest of the Property 
affected by the foreclosure; 
b. For an order altering or amending its December 15,1998 Order; and 
c. For an order certifying its December 15,1998 Order for immediate 
appeal. 
27. Appellants failed to notice up these motions so the trial court could rule on 
them before the sheriffs sale on February 10,1999. 
28. As regularly scheduled, the sheriff's sale took place on February 10,1999, 
at which Ocwen purchased the Property for a credit bid of $85,000. The sheriff's sale 
was also attended by Appellants who made no attempt to submit a bid on the Property. 
29. On August 10,1999, following the expiration of the six-month statutory 
redemption period, Appellants filed a Motion to Set Aside Foreclosure Sale, or 
Alternatively, to Enlarge the Redemption Period. (R. at 1136-42.) 
30. On November 22, 1999, ten months after the sheriffs sale, Appellants 
finally filed a Request for Hearing on the above motion and the three motions filed by 
Appellants approximately a year earlier. (R. at 1223-25.) 
31. Shortly thereafter, Appellants withdrew their Request for Hearing. (R. at 
1229-31.) 
32. On December 20,1999, Ocwen filed a Request for Hearing asking the 
trial court to schedule Appellants' motions for hearing. This request was made to bring 
finality to the case even though Ocwen did not believe there were any pending motions 
that had not already been ruled on or rendered moot by the sheriffs sale. (R. at 1238-40.) 
33. Appellants objected to Ocwen's Request for Hearing on Appellants' own 
motions. As a result, no hearing was scheduled. (R. at 1241-43.) 
34. On October 31, 2000, nearly twenty months after the sheriffs sale, Ocwen 
tried again to bring finality to the case by filing a second Request for Ruling on all 
pending motions before the trial court. (R. at 1323-26.) 
35. A hearing was held on December 13, 2000 from which the trial court issued 
a written Ruling denying all of Appellants' pending motions. (R. at 1355-58.) This 
Ruling was incorporated into the order entered on January 16, 2001 and a Minute Entry 
entered January 18, 2001. (R. at 1365-67 and 1370-72.) 
36. In its Ruling and Order, the trial court specifically denied all of Appellants' 
motions, ruled that the sheriffs sale held on February 10,1999 was valid and enforceable 
and held that the redemption period expired on August 10,1999, six months after the 
sheriff's sale. (R. at 1365-67 and 1370-72.) 
n 
37. On February 15, 2001, Appellants filed a Notice of Appeal from the 
January 16, 2001 Order. (R. at 1382-84.) 
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT 
This Court should dismiss Appellants' appeal for failure to show how the issues 
raised in their appeal were preserved in the trial court. In their opening brief, Appellants 
fail to include citation to the record showing how each issue was preserved or a statement 
indicating why Appellants seek review of issues not preserved in the trial court. 
If this Court concludes Appellants sufficiently preserved the issues raised on 
appeal, the Court should nevertheless affirm the trial court's award of summary judgment 
granted in Admiral and Ocwen's favor and affirm the decree of foreclosure and order of 
sale of the Property. 
Specifically, this Court should affirm the trial court's ruling that Appellants 
elected their remedy by treating the Trust Deed as voidable and obtaining and collecting a 
judgment against Epley for amounts directly related to the Trust Deed. Furthermore, the 
trial court correctly ruled that the post-judgment motions filed by Appellants, in which 
Appellants sought to have the summary judgment award overturned and the sheriffs sale 
set aside, are moot. Appellants purposefully failed and refused for nearly two years to 
notice up their motions for ruling by the trial court. As a result, the sheriffs sale took 
place as scheduled, the redemption period expired, and the Property was sold to a bona 
fide purchaser. Third, this Court should further affirm the trial court's ruling that the 
sheriff's sale was a valid and enforceable sale that extinguished all rights and interests of 
Appellants in and to the Property. Lastly, Appellants have unclean hands because they 
participated and acquiesced in the very acts of forgery they complain of, specifically their 
sister, Defendant Epley's forgery of their deceased father's name to a trust agreement and 
quit-claim deed, and accordingly Appellants should not profit as a result of such acts. 
ARGUMENT 
I. APPELLANTS HAVE FAILED TO SHOW HOW THE ISSUES RAISED IN 
THEIR APPEAL WERE PRESERVED IN THE TRIAL COURT. 
Pursuant to Rule 24(a)(5) of the Utah Rules of Appellate Procedure, Appellants 
are required to include in their opening brief "a statement of the issues presented for 
review." Utah R. App. P. 24(a)(5). Appellants are further required to include "citation to 
the record showing that the issue was preserved in the trial court" or a "statement of 
grounds for seeking review of an issue not preserved in the trial court." Id. 
In their opening brief, Appellants list four issues presented for review on appeal. 
However, Appellants fail to include appropriate citation to the record showing how each 
issue was preserved in the trial court or a statement indicating why Appellants seek 
review of issues not preserved below. Furthermore, Appellants include no citation to the 
record throughout their entire opening brief, including no citation to the record for the 
statement of the facts and proceedings below as is required by Rule 24(a)(7) of the Utah 
Rules of Appellate Procedure. Utah R. App. P. 24(a)(7) ("All statements of fact and 
references to the proceedings below shall be supported by citations to the record in 
accordance with paragraph (e) of this rule."). 
Accordingly, Admiral and Ocwen ask that Appellants' appeal be dismissed for 
failure to strictly comply with Rule 24 of the Utah Rules of Appellate Procedure. 
II. APPELLANTS ARE BARRED FROM RECOVERING THE PROPERTY 
BY THE DOCTRINE OF ELECTION OF REMEDIES. 
Appellants have elected their remedy in this matter by obtaining a final judgment on 
the merits against Epley and collecting on that judgment, and thus they are now precluded 
from recovering the Property. Under Utah law, the doctrine of election of remedies is 
"a technical rule of procedure and its purpose is not to prevent recourse to any 
remedy, but to prevent double redress for a single wrong. Said doctrine 
presupposes a choice between inconsistent remedies, and knowledgeable 
selection of one thereof, free of fraud or imposition, and a resort to the chosen 
remedy evincing a purpose to forego all others." 
Palmer v. Hayes, 892 P.2d 1059,1061-62 (Utah Ct. App. 1995) (quoting Angelos v. First 
Interstate Bank, 671 P.2d 772,778 (Utah 1983) (quotation omitted))1. 
As demonstrated by Palmer, Utah recognizes the doctrine of election of remedies 
notwithstanding Appellants' suggestion to the contrary in their Brief. See also Dugan v. 
Jones, 615 P.2d 1239,1247 (Utah 1980); Brigham City Sand & Gravel v. Machinery Ctr.f 
Inc., 613 P.2d 510,512 (Utah 1980); Mecham v. Benson, 590 P.2d 304, 307-08 (Utah 
1979). In addition, while Rule 8(e) of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure allows a party to 
pursue inconsistent claims, it does not allow a party to have a double recovery for the same 
loss and so does not invalidate the doctrine of election of remedies. See Brigham City Sand 
<fc Grave/, 613 P.2d at 511. 
A. The Remedies Appellants Seek are Inconsistent, Because the Facts on which 
Each Remedy Relies are Inconsistent. 
Appellants are barred from recovering the Property because that remedy presumes 
that title to the Property lies in them while their judgment for money damages presumes that 
Epley or her successors have title. The election of remedies doctrine 
applies as a bar only where the two actions are inconsistent, generally based 
upon incompatible facts; the doctrine does not operate as an estoppel where 
the two or more remedies are given to redress the same wrong and are 
consistent. Where the remedies afforded are inconsistent, it is the election of 
one that bars the other; but where they are consistent, it is the satisfaction that 
operates as a bar. 
Farmers & Merchants Bank v. Universal C.I.T. Credit Corp., 289 P.2d 1045,1049 (Utah 
1955) (citations omitted). 
In Hoskins v. Smith, the plaintiff obtained a default judgment for $2,500 against the 
defendant on the ground that the defendant had perpetrated a fraud upon him. 233 P. 279, 
279-80 (Wash. 1925). Later, the plaintiff brought an action seeking to have the defendant's 
declaration of homestead declared null and void on the ground that the property claimed as 
the homestead was purchased with funds fraudulently acquired from the plaintiff. Id. at 
279. The defendant contended that by bringing his action for general damages, the plaintiff 
had waived his right to impress a trust and had made an election as to his remedy. Id. at 
280. 
Agreeing with the defendant, the court stated that 
we have followed the well-established rule that one who has the right to 
impress a trust may either bring an action for damages or an action to impress 
a trust; that the bringing of either is an election as to the remedy; and that, if 
the action be brought for damages and a general judgment obtained, no right 
exists thereunder to set aside a homestead. 
I A 
(a) Id. (citations omitted). The court found that at the time the plaintiff 
brought his suit for damages, he knew that a fraud had been committed upon 
him, that the property out of which he claimed he was defrauded had been 
transferred to an innocent purchaser, and therefore he had two remedies open 
to him — to impress a trust upon the proceeds of the property wherever 
found, or to bring an action for damages. Having chosen his action in law for 
damages, he may not now sue for equitable relief. 
Id. Thus, the plaintiff was barred from pursuing the property. Id.; see also Hussey v. 
Bryant, 49 A. 56,56 (Me. 1901) (stating that plaintiff could waive alleged defects in 
condemnation proceeding and obtain just compensation for her land or could take advantage 
of irregularities in proceedings, regard land as still her property, and maintain trespass for 
any injury to her possession thereof, but she could not do both). 
Similarly, in Sannini v. Casscells, a saleswoman purchased for herself property that 
was being actively sought by the plaintiffs as her broker's customers. 401 A.2d 927,928 
(Del. 1979). The plaintiffs obtained a judgment against the saleswoman imposing a 
constructive trust on the property and ordering her to reconvey it to the plaintiffs 
conditioned upon the plaintiffs tendering to her such portion of the purchase price and 
settlement costs that she had previously paid. Id. The plaintiffs did not remit payment to 
the saleswoman because the rental market for the property had deteriorated since their cause 
of action arose, which prevented them from obtaining financing to acquire title to the 
property. Id. The plaintiffs asserted that "because their inability to obtain financing meant 
that they were not left in status quo ante, they should be awarded damages as an alternative 
remedy." Mat930. 
In rejecting the plaintiffs' claim, the court noted that when their cause of action 
arose, the plaintiffs 
had the choice of proceeding in equity to impress a constructive trust on the 
property or at law for damages. The equitable remedy proceeds on the 
theory that title to the property lies in the plaintiffs and that the defendants 
simply hold the property as constructive trustees for the plaintiffs; the legal 
remedy for damages proceeds on the assumption that title to the property is 
in the defendants. 
Id. at 931. The court concluded that "[b]ecause the two remedies are irreconcilably 
inconsistent, the choice of [the plaintiffs] to proceed in equity to impress a constructive 
trust constituted an election of remedies, and the pursuit of that choice to final judgment 
now precludes them from seeking damages." Id. Moreover, the deterioration of the 
rental value of the property did not permit the plaintiffs to "turn this typical equity case 
into a law suit for damages." Id. The court concluded by stating that "having elected to 
disaffirm the sale of the property to [the defendants] by pressing the equity remedy to the 
constructive trust end, [the plaintiffs] may not now seek to affirm the transaction by 
seeking money damages." Id. 
As in Hoskins and SanninU Appellants had the choice of either proceeding in 
equity to have the Quit-Claim Deeds and Trust Deed declared null and void, or at law for 
money damages. Appellants chose to pursue their legal remedy for money damages, 
which proceeded on the assumption that the Quit-Claim Deeds had effectively conveyed 
title to Defendant Epley and that the Trust Deed was a valid lien on the Property. As the 
trial court recognized, the judgment against Defendant Epley was "directly related to the 
amount of the loan made by Admiral to Epley — which loan was secured by the property 
which is the subject of this action." (R. at 1040.) The $81,079.83 judgment entered was 
expressly for $55,000 principal (the amount of the Note and Trust Deed to Admiral), 
$4,852.05 interest thereon calculated from June 1,1995 (the date that the Note and Trust 
Deed were executed), and $15,000 punitive damages plus attorney's fees and costs. 
Because the judgment sought by Appellants compensated them for the loss of the Property 
in amounts closely tied to the Trust Deed, it is clear that Appellants assumed for purposes of 
said judgment that title to the Property was in Epley. As such, it is irreconcilably 
inconsistent for Appellants to now claim that title to the Property is in them. See Dugan v. 
Jones, 615 P.2d 1239,1243 (Utah 1980) ('The Joneses by electing to seek damages, rather 
than rescission, have affirmed the underlying mortgage and note."). They cannot elect to 
affirm the Quit-Claim Deeds and Trust Deed by seeking money damages for the Property's 
loss and then seek to disaffirm the transfer and encumbrance of the Property by attacking 
the validity of the very same documents. 
B. Final Judgment on Appellants' Claim for Money Damages Bars Them from 
Seeking the Return of the Property. 
On a related issue, since the remedies sought by Appellants are predicated on two 
inconsistent sets of facts involving title to the Property, satisfaction of the judgment is not 
what bars Appellants from pursuing an alternative remedy. As the Utah Supreme Court has 
recognized: "Where the remedies afforded are inconsistent, it is the election of one that bars 
the other; but where they are consistent, it is the satisfaction that operates as a bar." 
Farmers & Merchants, 289 P.2d at 1049. At the latest, an election occurs when "a plaintiff 
has obtained a viable judgment on one of the claims." Saucier v. State Tax Assessor, 745 
A.2d 972,975 (Me. 2000). In Royal Resources, Inc. v. Gibralter Financial Corp., the Utah 
Supreme Court tacitly recognized this principle when it stated: "It is noteworthy that, 
except for the stipulation[2], had plaintiff chosen to take judgment against Gibralter, such 
may well have been viewed as an election of remedies, and if properly raised as a defense, it 
would have obviated the necessity of trial and this appeal." 603 P.2d 793,796 (Utah 1979). 
Sloss-Sheffield Steel & Iron Co. v. Wilkes, 165 So. 764 (Ala. 1936), the case cited by 
Appellants to support their claim that they are not barred from seeking recovery of the 
Property until they have satisfied their money judgment, is inaipposite.3 Sloss-Sheffield 
discusses the methods by which a mortgagee may protect its interest in mortgaged property 
that has been damaged by a third party. Id. at 767. As Appellants point out, the case holds 
that a mortgagee may maintain an action against the third party for damages, for a personal 
judgment against the debtor, or for foreclosure. Id. All of these remedies, however, are 
based upon the same, consistent set of facts. There is no dispute as to who has title to or a 
security interest in the property in Sloss-Sheffield. By contrast, in the instant matter 
Appellants cannot recover money damages without assuming that title to the Property is in 
Epley, a set of facts that is entirely inconsistent with Appellants' current action to recover 
2
 The parties in Royal Resources had entered into a stipulation whereby the plaintiff was 
permitted to take judgment against Gibralter, and in the event of no recovery, to then 
proceed against two other defendants individually. 
3
 In addition, Sloss-Sheffield has been overruled by Henderson v. Wade Sand & Gravel 
Co., 388 So. 2d 900 (Ala. 1980). 
the Property, which assumes an entirely different set of facts centered on the notion that title 
is in Appellants. 
Likewise, Brigham City Sand & Gravel v. Machinery Center, Inc., 613 P.2d 510 
(Utah 1980), does not support Appellants' position. In Brigham City, the plaintiffs claimed 
that their property, worth $12,000, had been converted and sold by several defendants, the 
Jensens, to the defendant Machinery Center for $8,500. Id. at 511. The plaintiffs sought 
both damages against the Jensens for the value of the converted property and return of the 
property from Machinery Center. Id. The plaintiffs settled their damage claim against the 
Jensens for $2,500. Id. Afterward, Machinery Center moved to dismiss the claim for 
recovery of the property on the ground that the plaintiffs "had elected their remedy of 
accepting $2,500 damages for the conversion of their property and, having thus been paid 
for it, they were precluded from also seeking its return." Id. 
Contrary to Appellants' assertion that the plaintiffs' settlement payment of $2,500 
constituted full satisfaction of its claim that resulted in the dismissal of the alternative claims 
against Machinery Center for recovery of the property, the plaintiffs settled their claims for 
damages for only $2,500 (20% of their total claim) and they reserved in that settlement their 
rights to recover the converted property from Machinery Center. The Utah Supreme Court 
held that the plaintiffs could not "recover for the value of [their] property (as plaintiffs did 
from the Jensens here) through whom defendant Machinery Center derived its title, and then 
recover the property from the latter." Id. at 512 (emphasis added). In other words, the 
plaintiffs did not recover the value of the property ($12,000). They recovered only $2,500 
"for" the value of the property. Moreover, the reservation of rights did not prevent the 
application of the doctrine of election of remedies. Having elected to accept $2,500 for the 
value of the property, the plaintiffs were barred from recovering the property itself from the 
innocent purchaser of that property. 
Thus, even Brigham City Sand & Gravel demonstrates that it is not the satisfaction 
of Appellants' damage claim that bars the alternative claim for recovery of the property. 
Rather, it is the election of the damage remedy (whether by settlement or by taking a 
judgment) that bars the alternative claim for recovery of the property. Satisfaction did not 
occur in Brigham City Sand & Gravel and it need not occur here in order for the doctrine of 
election of remedies to bar Appellants' claim for the recovery of the Property. The fact that 
a plaintiff is able to collect only a fraction of his judgment is not relevant in determining 
whether an election of remedies has been made. See Royal Resources, 603 P.2d at 796 
(recognizing that had plaintiff elected to take judgment against corporation instead of 
individuals it probably would have been barred by doctrine of election of remedies from 
pursuing them despite fact that judgment against corporation "was of little or no value"). 
C. Appellants' Recovery of the Property would Constitute Double Recovery. 
Appellants should not be allowed to recover the Property because the judgment and 
the Property represent compensation for the same loss suffered by Appellants. It is well 
settled under Utah law that one of the primary purposes of the doctrine of election of 
remedies is "'to prevent double redress for a single wrong.'" Palmer v. Hayes, 892 P.2d 
1059,1062 (Utah Ct. App. 1995) (quoting Angelos v. First Interstate Bank, 671 P.2d 772, 
778 (Utah 1983)). 
In Brigham City Sand & Gravel, the Utah Supreme Court explained that "the trial 
court correctly took the view that the matter of terminology should be disregarded and the 
transaction looked at for what it actually was: that what the plaintiffs were suing the Jensens 
for was conversion of their property; and that the settlement agreement stated" that the 
parties' claims had been fully adjusted and compromised on the merits. 613 P.2d at 512. 
Noting that the doctrine of election of remedies is based upon principles of equity and 
justice, the court held that "[i]t would be plainly contrary to those principles to allow a party 
to recover for the value of his property (as plaintiffs did from the Jensens here) through 
whom defendant Machinery Center derived its title, and then recover the property from the 
latter." Id. Thus, having elected to accept the $2,500 from the Jensens, the plaintiffs were 
precluded from pursuing the property in the hands of the defendant Machinery Center. Id. 
Similarly, Appellants admit that they have obtained a judgment against Epley "based 
upon her fraud." (Appellants Br. at 5) (emphasis added.) They further admit that 
"regardless of whether plaintiffs obtain the relief they seek against Admiral and Ocwen 
regarding the cloud on the title to the Property, the amount of the judgment plaintiffs have 
obtained against Lydia Epley will not be abated." (Appellants Br. at 6) (emphasis added.) 
That judgment includes $55,000 for the amount of the Trust Deed against the Property to 
Admiral and Ocwen. If the Trust Deed is removed, the Property would no longer be subject 
to that $55,000 lien and the $55,000 included in the judgment, which would not be abated, 
would represent a recovery of the same $55,000 twice. That is double recovery and 
constitutes inconsistent remedies. No statement by Appellants to the contrary can change 
those facts. 
Moreover, Appellants, in collecting on their judgment, recovered approximately 
$35,000 from Epley, their judgment debtor, prior to the judgment from which this appeal 
was taken. This included having obtained a conveyance of Epley's full 25% interest in the 
Property quit-claimed to Appellants at a hearing on an Order in Supplemental Proceedings 
under Rule 69(k) and (1) of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure. That 25% interest is worth at 
least $25,000. Appellants have been collecting on the judgment since its entry (garnishment 
papers constituting approximately one-half of the district court file) and their efforts may 
well result in full recovery. Thus, a nullification of the Trust Deed, giving Appellants full 
unencumbered ownership of the Property as well as damages, would clearly represent a 
double recovery, which necessitates the application of the doctrine of election of remedies. 
in. THE ISSUES RAISED BY APPELLANTS ARE MOOT AND BARRED BY 
THE DOCTRINE OF LACHES. 
The sheriff's sale held nearly three years ago and the expiration of the redemption 
period has rendered any issue with respect to the judgment entered by the trial court moot 
and barred by the doctrine of laches. The Property has been sold to a bona fide third 
party and cannot now be regained in order to provide the re lief requested by Appellants 
in this appeal. 
In Franklin Financial v. New Empire Development Co., a situation similar to the 
case at hand, a seller of an apartment complex sought to foreclose on a contract of sale. 
659 P.2d 1040,1042 (Utah 1983). The trial court granted title seller summary judgment 
and ordered a decree of foreclosure and sale of the property. Id. The buyers filed notices 
of appeal but failed to file a supersedeas bond or obtain a stay of the judgment and, as a 
result, the foreclosure sale took place as scheduled. Id. at 1043. On appeal, the sellers 
argued the appeal should be dismissed as moot because the foreclosure sale had already 
been carried out and the redemption period had expired. Id. 
In ruling on the matter, the Utah Supreme Court held "[a]n appeal is moot if 
during the pendency of the appeal circumstances change so that the controversy is 
eliminated, thereby rendering the relief requested impossible or of no legal effect." Id. 
The court further held "if appellants were seeking on this appeal to prevent the 
foreclosure sale, and because of their failure to obtain a stay of execution, the sale were 
legally carried out during the pendency of the appeal and the time for redemption had 
run, the appeal would be moot." Id.; see also Osguthorpe v. Osguthorpe, 872 P.2d 1057, 
1058 (Utah Ct. App. 1994) ("A case is moot when the requested relief cannot affect the 
rights of the litigants."); Black v. Alpha Fin. Corp., 656 P.2d 409,411 (Utah 1982) 
(same) (citations omitted). 
Furthermore, in Papanikolas Bros. Enters, v. Sugarhouse Shopping Ctr. Assocs., 
the Utah Supreme Court held a claim on appeal may be barred by the doctrine of laches if 
there is a lack of diligence on the part of the plaintiff which results in injury to the 
defendant. See 535 P.2d 1256, 1260 (Utah 1975). In applying the doctrine of laches to 
foreclosure sales, parties having an interest in the subject property "must redeem or assert 
any other available remedies within a reasonable time after the sale i.e., before the 
defense of laches becomes available to the purchaser." David A. Thomas & James H. 
Backman, Thomas and Backman on Utah Real Property Law §14.03(c)(2)(iii)(A) (1999). 
See also 55 Am. Jur. 2d Mortgages § 911 (1996) ("[T]he right to redeem may be lost by 
laches unless asserted within a reasonable time, and before the situation of the parties has 
changed, and the rights of others have intervened "). 
In the case at hand, the trial court granted summary judgment in Admiral and 
Ocwen's favor on December 15,1998, ruling the Trust Deed executed by Epley was a 
valid and enforceable first lien against the Property and ordering a decree of foreclosure 
and order of sale of the Property. Under Rule 4(a) of the Utah Rules of Appellate 
Procedure, Appellants had thirty days to appeal the trial court's final order of summary 
judgment, but chose not to. Utah R. App. P. 4(a) ("[T]he notice of appeal required by 
Rule 3 shall be filed with the clerk of the trial court within 30 days after the date of entry 
of the judgment or order appealed from."). 
Instead, on December 24,1998, apparently in an effort to stop the sheriffs sale, 
Appellants filed three motions with the trial court. Particularly, Appellants asked the trial 
court (1) to clarify its December 15,1998 Order, (2) to alter, or amend the order, or (3) to 
certify the order for immediate appeal. Appellants made no attempt to protect the 
Property by posting a supersedeas bond or obtaining a stay of enforcement of the order, 
which is allowed pursuant to Rule 62(b) of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure and Rule 
8(a) of the Utah Rules of Appellate Procedure. See Utah R. Civ. P. 62(b) ("[T]he court 
may stay the execution of, or any proceedings to enforce, a judgment pending the 
disposition of a motion for a new trial or to alter or amend a judgment made pursuant to 
Rule 59, or of a motion for relief from a judgment or order made pursuant to Rule 60 . . . 
."); Utah R. App. P. 8(a) ("A motion for [a stay of the judgment or for approval of a 
supersedeas bond] may be made to the appellate court."). 
After filing the motions and having the ability and wherewithal to notice up the 
motions, Appellants failed and refused to submit the motions to the trial court for ruling. 
As a result, the trial court could not hear and rule on the motions before the sheriffs sale, 
which took place as originally scheduled on February 10,1999. At the sheriffs sale 
Ocwen purchased the Property and later resold it to a bona fide third party, who is 
entitled to retain the Property. See Utah R. Civ. P. 69(j)(6) ("If no redemption is made 
within six months after the sale, the purchaser or the purchaser's assignee is entitled to a 
conveyance."). 
During the six-month statutory redemption period Appellants had ample 
opportunity to redeem the Property, as is allowed by Rule 69(j) of the Utah Rules of Civil 
Procedure, but elected not to. See Utah R. Civ. P. 69(j). Instead, on August 10,1999, the 
last day of the redemption period, Appellants filed a fourth motion, this time seeking to 
set aside the sheriffs sale or alternatively to enlarge the redemption period. Appellants, 
however, made no attempt to expedite the noticing up of this motion, or the three motions 
previously filed, so the trial court could properly rule and decide the issues before the 
expiration of the redemption period. 
Finally, ten months after the sheriffs sale and nearly a year after the December 15, 
1998 decree of foreclosure and order of sale had been issued, Appellants noticed up their 
four outstanding motions. Shortly thereafter, Appellants withdrew the request. As a 
result, Ocwen then requested Appellants motions be submitted to the trial court for 
ruling. Although it was Ocwen's position that all of the motions had been rendered moot 
by the sheriffs sale and the expiration of the statutory redemption period, Ocwen 
requested the hearing to bring finality to the case. Surprisingly, Appellants then objected 
to the noticing up of their own motions and a hearing was never set. 
Nearly a year later and twenty months after the sheriffs sale, Ocwen attempted for 
a second time to notice up Appellants' motions and a hearing was finally held on 
December 13, 2000. During that hearing the trial court judge commented at length on the 
mootness of Appellants' motions.4 Shortly after the hearing the trial court issued its 
Ruling, in which the trial court denied all of Appellants' motions holding that such were 
invalid, ineffective, and moot.5 
On this appeal, Appellants seek to have the Trust Deed invalidated and the 
Property returned to them. However, by not posting a supersedeas bond and obtaining a 
stay of the foreclosure order, by allowing the foreclosure sale to take place as scheduled, 
4
 Specifically, the trial court judge noted as follows: 
THE JUDGE: Counsel,... I will tell you not to hold your, not to exercise 
too much hope, Mr. Brown, because it strikes me that if the sale has taken 
place and the redemption period run, and the property has now been 
transferred to a third party, at some point there's got to be finality . . . But 
don't hold your breath. All right? 
(R. at 1445, p. 18-19.) 
5
 In its Ruling, the trial court specifically stated as follows: 
Plaintiffs' appeal period has expired and its efforts to seek some relief from 
a foreclosure sale also is moot. The sale was held nearly two years ago and 
the redemption period expired way over a year ago. Plaintiffs' claims are 
moot. 
(R. at 1357.) 
by making no attempt to redeem the Property before expiration of the redemption period, 
by purposefully refusing and failing to notice up their motions for ruling for nearly two 
years and by allowing the Property to be sold to a bona fide third party, Appellants have 
failed to diligently take all steps necessary to preserve the return of the Property as a 
possible remedy on appeal. Even if the return of the Property were a possible remedy, 
doing so would work a manifest injustice to the bona fide third party who purchased the 
Property after the sheriffs sale held nearly three years ago. Accordingly, this Court 
cannot provide the relief requested by Appellants and must deny their claims as moot and 
barred by the doctrine of laches. 
For convenience of the Court, Appellees submit the following table which sets 
forth in short form the dates and events that clearly demonstrate the mootness of 
Appellants' appeal: 
TSvlOCI 1 
1 Date 
December 14,1998 
December 15, 1998 
December 24,1998 
February 10,1999 
August 10,1999 
August 10,1999 
November 22,1999 
December 8,1999 
December 20, 1999 
December 21,1999 
October 31, 2000 
December 13, 2000 
December 13, 2000 
January 16, 2001 
i February 15, 2001 
Event 
Judgment, Decree of Foreclosure and Order of Sale entered by 
the trial court. 
Order Granting Admiral and Ocwen's Motion for Summary 
Judgment and Denying Plaintiffs' Motion for Summary 
Judgment entered by the trial court. 
Appellants file three motions seeking to clarify, alter, or amend 
the December 15,1998 order. 
Sheriffs sale. 
Expiration of the six-month redemption period. 1 
Appellants file fourth motion seeking to set aside the foreclosure 1 
sale or to enlarge the redemption period. 
Appellants file Request for Hearing on their four motions. 
Appellants withdraw their Request for Hearing. 1 
Ocwen files Request for Hearing on Appellants' four motions. 1 
Appellants object to Ocwen's Request for Hearing. 1 
Ocwen files second Request for Hearing on Plaintiffs' four J 
motions. 
Hearing on Appellants' four motions. 1 
Court Ruling denying Appellants' four motions. 1 
Order denying Appellants' four motions. 1 
Notice of Appeal filed. | 
IV. THE SHERIFF'S SALE EXTINGUISHED ALL RIGHT, TITLE, AND 
INTERESTS OF APPELLANTS IN THE PROPERTY. 
A. Appellants Had Notice of the Sale. 
1. Notice required by Rule 69 of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure was 
properly given. 
Utah Code Annotated provides that judicial foreclosure sales must follow the 
notice procedures outlined in Rule 69 of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure. Utah Code 
Ann. § 78-37-1 (2001) (stating sheriffs sales to be conducted "according to the 
provisions of law relating to sales on execution."). See also David A. Thomas & James 
H. Backman, supra, § 14.03(c)(6)(ii)(A) (1999) (same). 
Pursuant to Rule 69(i) written notice of the time and place of sale and a 
description of the property to be sold must be posted, for 21 days, on the property to be 
sold, at the place of sale, and at the trial courthouse where the property is located. See 
UTAH R. CIV. P. 69(i)(l)(C). Written notice must further be published three times for 
three consecutive weeks in a newspaper of general circulation in the county. See id. 
Ocwen strictly complied with the notice requirements set forth above by causing the Utah 
County Sheriff to post written notice of the time and place of sale and a description of the 
Property (1) on the Property, (2) at the Utah County courthouse, and (3) in a Utah County 
paper of general circulation. 
2. Appellants are not judgment debtors entitled to personal service. 
Rule 69(i) further provides written notice must be personally served upon any and 
all judgment debtors. Appellants in this case are not judgment debtors, and therefore, are 
not entitled to personal service. As such, personal service was not made upon them. 
In their brief, Appellants concede they are not judgment debtors, but nevertheless 
argue they are in a position similar to judgment debtors and thus are entitled to personal 
service under Rule 69. (Appellants Br. at 31.) In support of their position, Appellants cite 
to Taubert v. Roberts, a case in which the Utah Supreme Court declared an execution sale 
void for failure of the county sheriff to levy on the subject property prior to the writ of 
execution return date. 747 P.2d 1046,1047 (Utah 1987). Taubert, however, is not 
controlling precedent, as the plaintiff in that case was in fact the judgment debtor whose 
property was being foreclosed against. In the case at hand, Appellants are not judgment 
debtors, but merely individuals who claimed an interest in the Property being foreclosed 
against pursuant to an order entered by the trial court in a case in which Appellants were 
named as parties. 
The provisions of Rule 69 are clear. If the rule drafters intended for personal service 
to be made upon certain individuals in addition to judgment debtors, the rule would have 
provided for such. Accordingly, Appellants have no grounds upon which to claim the 
sheriffs sale should be set aside because the required notice was given and Appellants are 
not judgment debtors entitled to personal service. 
B. Appellants Attended the Sale. 
Appellants are further not entitled to claim the sheriffs sale should be set aside 
because Appellants had notice of the sale and attended the sale. In Concepts, Inc. v. First 
Security Realty Services, Inc., the Utah Supreme Court sets forth the reasons for the strict 
notice requirements in foreclosure sales. See 743 P.2d 1158, 1159 (Utah 1987).6 
Specifically, the court stated as follows: 
The purpose of strict notice requirements . . . is to inform persons with an 
interest in the property of the pending sale of that property, so that they 
may act to protect those interests. The objective of the notice is to prevent 
a sacrifice of the property. If that objective is attained, immaterial errors 
and mistakes will not affect the sufficiency of the notice or the sale made 
pursuant thereto. A party who seeks to have a trustee sale set aside for 
irregularity, want of notice, or fraud has the burden of proving his 
contention, it being presumed, in the absence of evidence to the contrary, 
6
 Although Concepts, Inc. v. First Security Realty Services, Inc., 743 P.2d 1158 (Utah 
1987) involves a nonjudicial foreclosure sale, the notice requirements (and the reasons for 
such notice requirements) for nonjudicial foreclosure sales and judicial foreclosure sales 
are similar. 
that the sale was regular. Defects in the notice of foreclosure sale that will 
authorize the setting aside of the sale must be those that would have the 
effect of chilling the bidding and causing an inadequacy of price. The 
remedy of setting aside the sale will be applied only in cases which reach 
unjust extremes. 
Id. at 1159 (citations omitted). 
In the case at hand, a sheriffs sale of the Property was held on February 10,1999. 
Counsel for Ocwen attended the sale and Ocwen purchased the Property for a credit bid 
of $85,000. Appellants also attended the sale and made no attempt during the sale to 
submit a bid on the Property or otherwise protect their alleged interests in the Property. 
Accordingly, this Court should not now set aside the foreclosure sale based upon 
Appellants' frivolous claims they did not receive proper notice of the sale, as they clearly 
attended the sale and had ample opportunity to protect their interests. 
C. The Foreclosure Order Clearly Included All Property Interests of 
Appellants. 
The goal of foreclosure proceedings is to pass title to the purchaser in the subject 
property, free and clear of any encumbrances. See David A. Thomas & James H. 
Backman, supra, §14.03(c)(2)(iii)(A) (1999). To accomplish this all persons with 
interests in the subject property that may be affected by the foreclosure sale must be 
joined as necessary parties to the judicial proceeding. Id. Once all necessary parties have 
been joined to the foreclosure action and a valid and enforceable sheriffs sale has taken 
place, all right, title, and interest the necessary parties may have had in the subject 
property are extinguished. Id. 
In the present case, Ocwen filed a Motion for Summary Judgment seeking 
judgment against Epley for the entire amount owing under the Note; judgment declaring 
the Deed of Trust executed by Epley to be a valid and enforceable first lien against the 
Property; and judicial foreclosure of the Property barring Appellants and Epley from any 
right, title, interest, lien, or estate in and to the Property, or any part thereof. Both 
Appellants and Epley were necessary parties properly joined to the foreclosure 
proceeding. 
On December 15,1998, the trial court granted Ocwen's motion and issued an 
order of sale and decree of foreclosure. As authorized by that order, on February 10, 
1999, a valid and enforceable sheriffs sale was held at which Ocwen purchased the 
Property. Six months later the statutory redemption period expired, with Appellants and 
Epley making no attempt in the interim to redeem. As a result, all right, title and interest 
Appellants and Epley in the Property has been extinguished and Appellants have no 
standing in this appeal to claim a return of the Property. 
D. The Sheriff's Sale is Not Barred by the Statute of Frauds. 
The statute of frauds did not prevent Ocwen from foreclosing on the Property. 
Appellants allege that the quit-claim deed from Epley, as successor trustee, to Epley, 
individually, is void under the statute of frauds because defendant Epley lacked authority 
to convey any interest in the Property. Appellants, however, misunderstand Utah's 
statute of frauds. Utah Code Ann. § 25-5-1 only requires that a deed conveying an 
interest in land be in writing and "be subscribed by the party granting the conveyance." 
Commercial Union Assoc, v. Clayton, 863 P.2d 29, 33 (Utah Ct. App. 1993). See also 
Utah Code Ann. § 25-5-1 (2001). Therefore, the quit-claim deed from Epley, as 
successor trustee, to Epley, individually, meets the requirements of Utah Code Ann. § 25-
5-1 because it is signed by the person granting the conveyance, Epley. 
Moreover, Appellants' statute of fraud argument fails because Appellants have no 
standing to bring the argument. Under Utah law, only a party to a contract or a party in 
privity with a party to the contract can raise the statute of frauds defense. See Garland v. 
Fleischmann, 831 P.2d 107,109 (Utah 1992). Appellants in this case were not a party to 
any of the deeds involving Epley nor are Appellants in privity with any of the parties 
named in those deeds. Therefore, Appellants' statute of frauds argument lacks merit and 
they lack standing to raise the argument. 
V. APPELLANTS PARTICIPATED IN THE FORGERY AND CANNOT 
BENEFIT FROM IT. 
Appellants have made much of their claim of forgery by Epley, an issue which the 
trial court did not reach because it was barred by the doctrine of election of remedies. To 
pursue their claim to invalidate the Trust Deed based on the alleged forgery in the chain of 
title would allow a double recovery. However, in their arguments with respect to that issue, 
Appellants have failed to mention that Appellants themselves participated in and agreed to 
the signing of their father's name on the Quit-Claim Deeds in order to avoid probate and 
possible tax consequences. (R. at 838,1445, p. 4; Epley Dep. at 120:17-132:15.) 
Appellants have also failed to mention that their father previously executed a deed 
identical to the deed forged by Epley, that the forged deed was signed for the sole purpose 
of replacing the previously signed deed that could not be located, and that Epley had 
permission from her father to sign his name on various documents, including the deed. 
(Epley Dep. at 152:8-153:25.) Thus, the deed was signed wilh the father's permission and 
with the approval of Appellants for the benefit of the estate of their father from which they 
would all benefit. Under such circumstances, Appellants are not in a position to argue the 
deed is a forgery and invalid. 
Had this issue not been barred by Appellants' election of remedies, the trial court 
would have then considered the issues of ratification, conspiracy, unclean hands, and 
whether Admiral and Ocwen held a valid equitable mortgage even if the express Trust Deed 
were voidable. Appellants witnessed the signing of the deed by their sister Epley, consented 
to it, and did nothing to put any other party who might deal with the Property on notice. A 
full year expired after the forgery before Epley signed the Trust Deed from which it is 
obvious there was no intent to defraud anybody at the time the father's name was placed on 
the deed. This fact alone constitutes a waiver by Appellants of any right to challenge the 
deed and their consent to the signing of the deed constitutes an estoppel. 
CONCLUSION 
For the foregoing reasons, this Court should dismiss Appellants' appeal for failure 
to demonstrate how the issues raised on appeal were preserved in the trial court. In the 
alternative, this Court should affirm the trial court's award of summary judgment in 
Admiral and Ocwen's favor and affirm the decree of foreclosure and order of sale of the 
Property. 
DATED this 12th day of December, 2001. 
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1 Q Do you kmmrt those two debts were peid off 
2 with loan proceeds? | 
3 
4 
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A Yes. 
Q Wars both of tham paid off? 
A Yas. 
Q Whathappanadtothatruck? 
A it's wrecked. 
Q Wasttlnsursd? 
A No. 
Q Whanwaaitwrackad? 
A 1996. 
Q WasRtotalad? 
A Yea. 
Q Who was driving it? 
A John Risaar. 
Q Waa that In Wyoming? 
A Yea, It waa. 
Q Did ha raimbursa you for tha valua of tha 
vahida? 
A No. 
Q On the top of Page 3 of Exhibit 2 there's 
rafarancatothaProvorasidanca. Do you saa that? 
A Uh-huh,yes. 
Q And thara's ralaranca to tha amount of 
mortgage liana against tha property, and it says 
42 
1 $55,000. Doyousaathat? 
2 A Yas. 
3 Q Is the* referriiig to the lien that was being 
4 givantoAdmiraiorwastharaanaxistinglianontha 
5 noma that had to ba paid off? 
6 A That houaa was paid 20 yaars ago. 
7 Q Fraa and dear? 
8 A Yas. 
9 Q All right And than tha naxt column ovar, do 
10 you see, It saye^roee rental Income." Do you saa 
11 that? It rater* to $800. 
12 A Yea. 
13 Q Waa your father's home being rented? 
14 A No. 
15 Q Do you know how that amount waa arrived at? 
16 A Tha lady that gave me the loan asked me, aha 
17 said If I put In that It waa rented that would show that 
18 I had income to the property. 
19 Q I see. 
20 A And I mean It would be better for me to do It 
21 that way. 
22 Q So that waant baaed on any actual rental? 
23 A No. Alex lived In the houaa. 
24 Q And Alex waant paying any rent so far aa you 
25 know? 
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A Wen, he waa supposed to be paying 500 a 1 
month, and that stopped. 1 mean that was the money that 1 
waa owed to me, had stopped in June. 1 
Q Explain tha money that waa owed to you. 1 
A WeN, h e - w e - l e f t see. Pat and land 1 
Alex and Yvonne agreed that If someone lived there they 1 
would pay $100 each to each of us, or 125, and put a 1 
hundred or 125 m tha bank for maintenance on tha house. I 
Q When was that agreement reached? I 
A Altar my dad died and he moved In. 1 
Q And did Alex make those payments for a whHa? 1 
A Yeah. They stopped on me in June. 1 dont 1 
know what*a happened since then. 1 
Q June of whan? 1 
A *95. 1 
Q And so, roughly, he paid you a hundred to 12S 1 
a month? 1 
A Just for a month or two. (think two months. 1 
1 think July-It was HI July. 1 
Q So you got a couple payments? 1 
A Uh-huh. 1 
Q Do you IOYOW if r^'smaldnguiose payments to 1 
your sisters? 1 
A I dont know. 1 
Q Do you recall who your contact was at Admiral 1 
44 1 
1 when you went to the closing, who was there? 
2 A Tha lady that gave me the loan at CFC 
3 Mortgage, thafa all I knew, and than there were a few 
4 other man there whan I signed tha signature, and I dont 
5 remember their names. 
6 (Defendant OCWEN'a Exhibit 3 marked 
7 for identification.) 
8 Q BY MR. ANDERSON: I'm handing you Exhibit 3 
9 to your deposition, which is a note that bears the date 
10 of June 1st, 1995. Have you seen that document before? 
11 A Well, I guess I have. I signed It It 
12 doeant look familiar, but there's a signature on there. 
13 Q Is tress copy of the original, so far as you 
14 know? 
Yes, I think so. 
And it was signed by you on June 2nd? 
Uh-huh, yes. 
At Guardian Title? 
Yes. 
And do you know who prepared the document 
21 Lydia? 
22 A I donX I thought It waa the lady that aoid 
23 -that gave me the money; Stephanie. I thought her name 
24 was Jennie or Jami, but I guess It's -
25 Q Under the terms of that note, as I understand 
15 
16 
17 
18 
19 
20 
A 
Q 
A 
Q 
A 
Q 
1 from your lather individually Into the trust, naming 
2 NmMH as tte trust**, and otter successor trust*** of 
3 tte Clarence G. Carrillo trust It also app*ars to hav* 
4 b**n notarized and boars tte signature of Laasa Day. 
5 Now, tall m* how this document aquarea with 
6 tte testimony you've given. 
7 A It looks like the same one to me as his 
8 original. 
9 Q Let me get at It this way: Have you ever 
10 seen the original of this Exhibit 9 before? 
11 A I've seen tte original that he signed the day 
12 I went to his house, yes. If this Is It or not, I don't 
13 know. 
14 Q Okay. So I think maybe I misunderstood you 
15 or you misunderstood me earlier, but on the day your 
16 father called you at work and asked you to come to the 
17 houae-
18 A Yes. 
19 Q «ttef* were documents that he signed? 
20 A Yes. 
21 Q And that Included a living will, the Uwt 
22 agreement, Exhibit 7. Did It also include the original 
23 of this Exhibit 9? 
24 A Yes. This was one of tte papers. 
25 Q So Cterewa* a oVe* that was .Mudetf? 
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1 A Yes. 
2 Q And you witnessed Nm sign tte original of 
3 this Exhibit 9? 
4 AY** . 
5 Q As well as tte will and tte trust agreement? 
6 A Yes. 
7 Q And you took tte three of those documents, 
8 and any others he might have signed, to work wtereL*asa 
9 Day notarized them? 
10 A Yes, I did. 
11 Q And would that have been August 17th perhaps? 
12 A Could have been. Idonlknow. I mean ft 
13 looks Uke It is, but I don't know. I don't remember tte 
14 dates. I can ted you tte month maybe, and I'm sure It 
15 was in August 
16 Q This is consistent with your testimony that 
17 you thought It was summer of *93? 
18 A Yes, becaus* we *nd*d up going to tte family 
19 reunion on August 6th, 7th and 8th. Som*wtere around 
20 there, tt was my dad's Milhday, and I do remember that 
21 Q Now, at tte time that your father executed 
22 Exhibit 7 - let me direct your attention back to this. 
23 Thtat* the trust agreement- did you review It? 
24 A Did I read It over? 
25 Q Yes. 
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1 A Yes. I did with my dad. 
2 Q Did you discuss It with him? 
3 A No. I mean I read It to him. He didn't ask 
4 me any questions. Tte only question tehad was about tte 
5 truck not being fat there, and that's because te bought 
6 k, I think, before tte time that this was drawn up. 
7 Q Vttiatdkl you umferstand tte purpose of tte 
8 trust agreement was? 
9 A That te-tefa see. Just a second. That 
10 before my dad died he wanted to have something set up fc 
11 Ns kids and grandkids tobe distributed to themandso 
12 that tte State of Utah wouldn't take any of his 
13 possession or go Into pfobate. 
14 Q Now, there came a time when your fatter 
15 passed away? 
16 A Yes. 
17 Q And after he was put to rest there was a 
18 meeting you told me about in a phone conversation you m 
19 I had a few weeks back. There was a meeting at your 
20 father's house? 
21 A In im/fattens nous*, tte Provor*sid*no*. 
22 Q That was a meeting attended by your sisters 
23 and your brother as well as yourself; Is that correct? 
24 A And tte grandkids also. 
25 Q Give m* a date If you can. Your fetter died, 
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1 was It May 23rd? May 24th? 
2 A Uh-huh.lt was. 
3 Q How long after Ms passing did tMa meeting 
4 occur? 
5 A That weekend of - Memorial weekend we buried 
6 him. H* dted on May 23rd, we buried Mm that Friday, and 
7 over that weekend we were talking about finding tte 
8 original wW and going from there* 
9 Q Was ttere son* discussion about the trust 
10 agreement at that time that you couldn't find tte 
11 original that had been eigned? 
12 A Wecouldnt find any paperwork that was 
13 signed. 
14 Q DM you go through Urn safe at fhatftmetn 
15 the house? 
16 A No,ldkhrt. 
17 Q Did someone else, as far as you know? 
18 A Yes. 
19 Q wan, tell m* about that meeting and what was 
20 discussed. 
21 A lthh*w*w*rehist*ittiiigstttekttcten 
22 table. We were talking about we needed to findthoee 
23 papereao that my dad'a property and Msaasete wouldn't 
24 go into probate. And everybody looked for them 
25 everywhere, andte had some hiding places. Looked kit 
121 
i lyior ve. tpiey Depo: Lydla Inez Carrillo Epley (5-29-97) 
1 vehtelee, the traitor out in the garage. I munwt tort 
2 his hoiise apart aftdcotikJ not find them. 
3 Q AIKI were spouses preserrt at tMs meeting? 
4 A Yes. 
5 Q And W M there aoma apaciflc convaraatton 
6 about not finding the original of Exhibit 7, thatruat 
7 agreement? 
8 A Y M . 
9 Q Andthatwaaaconcarnbacauaathatmaant 
10 thara may hava to ba a probata? 
11 A Yea. 
12 Q May ba tax conaaquaneaa? 
13 A Yaa. 
14 Q Andallofthatwaadiacuaaad? 
15 A Yaa. 
16 Q And ao what did you do about It? 
17 A WeH, we k>okedta-aU of hteldde looked 
18 around for h\ couldn't find M. At that timawa had 
19 efready the uneignedcopfee that waa eeirt to my dad'a 
20 houaa. 
21 Q From Mr. Brown? 
22 A Yaa. 
23 Q Documantain that anvalopa had arrtvad? 
24 A Yaa. 
25 Q So what did you do? 
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1 A We eat at the table. 
2 Q Who's "we"? 
3 A My lirothere, allot our Mde, all the epoueee 
4 that wara thara. And I mada a daciaion to forga my dad'a 
5 naniabacauaaldidnlwamthaStataofUtahtotakahia 
6 things. 
7 Q Waa anyonaalaa part of that daciaion? 
8 A Everybody waa. 
9 Q Tall me how. 
10 A AJIthaMda. 
11 Q Tall ma about tha diacuaaion landing up to 
12 that 
13 A Thara waa no discussion. ttwael either do 
14 whatlgottodoorthay'ragoingtotaicaavafytNngfrom 
15 my dad, the State la, and nry dad did IK* wart that 
16 Q Did you dlecuee that with your -
17 A Yaa. 
18 Q -slstarsandbrothar? 
19 A Yaa. 
20 Q Do you recall what they eald? Dtdthayagraa 
21 Itoughttobaforgad? 
22 A Wall, nobody didn't diaagraa. 
23 Q DW you say, •Hara is a copy-or words to 
24 that effect? "We have a copy of thie. Ifsomabody 
25 doeent sign Dad'a nama to thie, the State's going to 
1 8 
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3 
4 
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8 
9 
10 
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taka everything*? | 
A 
Q 
A 
Wad, It waa-
Idont want to put words In your mouth. 1 
Uweent discussed as that ttwasltoW 1 
ttwii^'lfl don't do what l*vs got to 1 
to taka Dad's stutT. | 
Q 
A 
Q 
A 
nama, 
Dkfyouaxpteinwhatltwaayouhadtodo? 1 
Yaa. Thay knew what had to ba dona. 1 
And ao what did you do? 1 
Sol aignad my dad'a itamef forged my dad'a 1 
want back to work, forgad Laaaa'a nama, and want 1 
from thara. 1 
Q So aomawhara thara la another varaion of 1 
ExWbtt 7 0 0 ^ ^ 1 8 1 ^ ^ - y o u r father's wm>a on trat 1 
version waa aignad by you? 1 
A 
Q 
Yaa. 1 
Right? 1 
And the notary on that version is also Laaaa 1 
Daya, but you wrote har nama? 1 
A 
Q 
A 
Q 
A 
Yaa, 1 did. 1 
So you forged the notary? 1 
Yaa. 1 
You forged your father'e nama? 1 
1 did It all the time for Laaaa on har other 1 
documents. She was trie Investigator, t was the 1 
124 J 
1 Investigative technician. Nana dWnt hava time to 
2 aign It, to get them aent out I had her stamp, stamped 
3 It, and I signed her name. 
4 Q Trtat waa cornmon practice? 
5 A In Recovery Servtcee It waa. All the 
6 Invaatigatoraafidthelnveetigatto 
7 aU the time. 
8 Q And aha knew you did that? 
9 A No. She did not know. 
10 Q She didnt know on occasion you used her-
11 A Yea, But not on this occasion aha did not 
12 know. 
13 O So let ma go back to INs meeting around the 
14 kitchen table, you in front of-was Alex there? 
15 A Yea. 
16 Q And your two sisters wara thara? 
17 A Yaa. 
18 Q And they watched you sign your father'e 
19 name-
20 A Yes, they dkl 
21 Q - t o the trust agreement? 
22 A To aH the paperwork. 
23 Q What other paperwork waa thara? 
24 A There waa another will - thara waa a will, 
25 and I'm aurafhia waa -the quit daim deed, and I 
1 thought than war* Ilka four or fiva othar papara bacauaa 
2 lsfgn^acouptothf*aorfour,1lvatimas. 
3 Q Do you think-turning your attention back 
4 toExMbtt9wMchiathaquitciaimdaadvmyquaationia 
5 didyouaignanotharvaiaionolthatdocumantatthasama 
6 tima? Was that Indudad in tha packet that caroa from 
7 Mr. Brown? 
8 A Yaa,Kwaa. 
9 Q And at that tima, did you sign tha quitclaim 
10 daadaawall? 
11 A Yaah. TWa Exhibit 97 
12 Q Yaa. 
13 A Yaa, I did. 
14 Q lathte-mmyouteatifladaarliar-
15 atrlkathat 
16 Earttar you taatiflad that you obaarvad that 
17 your tan™ **gii«d tha original olExNWt 8? 
18 A Yaa. 
19 Q Myquastfonthanta: la thia a copy of tha 
20 c>riginalthatyour1atharaign^loristhl«acopyoftha 
21 onatta^youloro^yourlathar'anamatoonthat 
22 Mamoriat Day waakand? 
23 A Idontknow. Thia looks Uka my dad's 
24 aignatura, but It could bamina. Idontknow. Imaanl 
25 did all my dad - l*va algnad my dad'a nama to avarything 
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1 avanwhanhawasaliva,aoldonlknowlfthlalaltor 
2 not, but- I couldn't taU you. I maan It looks Uka 
3 hia aignatura, but It also could bamina. Idontknow. 
4 Q WaH,axplain for ma why you aay you algnad 
5 your dad's nama. 
6 A Bacauaa I took cara of a lot of his buainaaa 
7 for him. 
8 Q Not forging chacks or doing aomathing 
9 dtehonaatbut-
10 A WaN,Htharaconaidafaddiahonaat,lguaaa 
11 ao bacauaa I did aign hia monay ordars somatimaa or 
12 paperwork of his. Hajuataaidsignlt 
13 Q But not for your own banaflt Thafa what 
14 I'm asking. 
15 A No. Idldltlbrmydadwlmhtepafinission. 
16 Q Thafa what I waa asking. 
17 So you'ra not aura, Lydia,lf thia Exhibit 9 
18 la tha original copy of tha original or tha onathatwaa 
19 algnad by you? 
20 A I don't Imaanl know for aura that all tha 
21 othar things in hara is my writing, bacauaa I llllad all 
22 trMapotemaxcapthiaaignatufa.butldon'tknowif 
23 this Is his signature or HITa my aignatura. 
24 Q WasthaofHrinalofthaqultcialmd^dha 
25 algnad that day ha callad you from work, was that avar 
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1 found? 
2 A No. 
3 Q Wall, tot ma diract your attention to tha 
4 racording data on Exhibit 9 In tha upper right hand 
5 cornar on tha trdrd Una thara's s ra<XKdlng data that 
6 says 1994 May 31. Do you aaa that? 
7 A Yaa, I aaa. 
8 Q So tMaaxMMt, tha original of thia 
9 Exhibit 9 was racordad after your fatharpaaaad away? 
10 A Right 
11 Q Do you racaN racording tha original of tha 
12 quit daim daadthat you forgad your fathar'a nama to 
13 that Mamorial Day waakand? Somatima after that you 
14 racordad It? 
15 A Youknowwhatl-l-ltcoukiba, I 
16 dont know. I ramambar taking Pat, and I had a bunch of 
17 paperwork, down to tha county dark's; and I maan thia 
18 could hava baan ona. Could hava been. 
19 Q Tha only way-
20 A Idontknow. I maan I really don't I 
21 dWnt avanknow It waaatampad or anything. I raairy 
22 dont know. I dont I mean -
23 Q You never found tha original that your father 
24 algnad? 
25 A Of thia (indicating)? 
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1 Q This (Indicating). 
2 A No. 
3 Q So woutdntth* suggest this was tha one 
4 that ww forgad? 
5 A Could be. I mean It looks -
6 Q Otharwlaa, aomaona had to find It after your 
7 father died ajKlfecotd It May 31at of 1994. 
8 A Rlgrs\ I maan I dont know If tha originate 
9 wars found or what Idontknow. I maan i coukfnt 
10 tell you. This could hatha forga.thia could bahia 
11 writing. Idontknow. 
12 lmaana1iltaK>wtewatookpapaiwork,took 
13 kovartrwra to tha county dark's, thaystempad It 
14 whatavarthaydldtoltajKlwawaragona. Imaanl 
15 -dont know. I coukfnt -
16 Q Your brothar knaw that you had dona thia? 
17 A Yaa. 
18 Q Your sisters knaw that you had dona thia? 
19 A Yaa. 
20 Q Did you avar tell Guardian Tltto Company that 
21 you had dona thia? 
22 A No. 
23 Q Did you avar tell-
24 A I dldntteH anybody. 
25 Q DMyouavartellJamlorJannlofCFC? 
129 
layior vs. Epley Depo: 
1 A No. 
2 Q Did you aver tail Admiral? 
3 A No. 
4 Q Did you avar tall Barkalay? 
5 A No. 
6 Q OrOCWEN? 
7 A No. 
8 Q No ona knaw axcapt you and your family? 
9 A Yes. 
10 Q Now, ol to original of the trust agreement, 
11 Exhibit 7 that you forgad your father's neroe to, what 
12 happened to that document? Do you still havatha 
13 original in Wyoming? 
14 A Yes, I do. 
15 Q Wars copies made for your brother and 
16 sisters? 
17 A Yes, they were. 
18 Q So they got copies of It? 
19 A Yes, they did. 
20 Q Did they get copies of the will as well? 
21 A They got copies of everything that I forged. 
22 Q You forged them, took them to your workplace 
23 where you had access to Lease's notary seal or stamp; 
24 correct? 
25 A Yeajdkf. 
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1 Q And after you finished that, you made copies? 
2 A Yes, I did. 
3 Q And distributed those copies to your brother 
4 and sisters? 
5 A Yes. 
6 Q Did you ever send a signed set back to 
7 Mr. Brown? 
8 A No.ldWnX 
9 Q Other than that one phone conversation with 
10 Mr. Brown, did you aver talk to Mm about the trust 
11 agreement, the will or other documents? 
12 A Nojdkfart. 
13 Q And have you ever spoken to anyone else about 
14 thia except for your family members? 
15 A Yes. When they started taking me to court 
16 I talked to a few lawyers about It whan I started getting 
17 m y -
18 Q Wageagarniahed? 
19 A - wages garnished, started serving me, 
20 coming to my work. Yes, I did. 
21 Q You consulted counsel on your behalf? 
22 A I went in Ilka for a one free hour 
23 consultation to Just find out, you know, what kind of 
24 trouble I would be in. 
25 Q At the time you were signing these documents. 
Inez Carrillo Epley (5-29-97) 
1 
2 
3 
4 
5 
6 
7 
8 
9 
10 
11 
12 
13 
14 
15 
I 16 I 17 I 18 I 19 
20 
I 21 I ** I a I 24 I ^ 
forging these documents at your father's kitchen table in I 
the home that you grew up In, did anyone around the table I 
say. "Lydia, don't do this. This Is wrong"? I 
A No. I 
Q No one tried to stop you? I 
A No. I 
Q You did it in plain view of everyone? I 
A Yesjdid. I 
Q And waa there any discussion after you gave I 
them their copies? I 
A No. I 
Q DW anyone say, "Donl record IT? I 
A No. They didn't say to or not to record K. I 
They didnt say anything. It was like it was already a I 
dona deal In our ayes. 1 
Q Have you discussed this with Lease Day? 1 
A The forgad ones? 1 
Q Yes. 1 
A No.lhavenX 1 
(Defendant OCWEN's Exhibit 10 marked I 
forkfentffication.) I 
Q BY MR. ANDERSON: Let me hand you Exhibit 10, 1 
and ask you to review that for a moment 1 
A (witness complies.) I 
Q Have you eeen the original or copy of that 1 
132 | 
1 letter before? 
2 A Nojhawrt . 
3 Q Thafs a latter bearing the signature, 
4 purportedly, of Lease Day to Jeff Brown; right? 
5 A Looks like that's what K is. 
6 Q Dated February 21st of 1997. 
7 A Yea. 
8 Q Let ma direct your attention to the second 
9 paragraph where aha says, I t Is not my practice to" -
10 la not my practice nor have I ever in the past notarized 
11 a document Improperly". 
12 Is that accurals, as far as you know? 
13 A I donl think It is, 
14 Q Because of the eeveral times in the ordinary 
15 courseof business at the State of Utah you notarized or 
16 you did the notarization on her behalf, right? 
17 A Yea, I have. And It was more than several 
18 times. 
19 Q Okay. Thafs why you would dispute that 
20 first sentence? 
21 A Yes. 
22 Q "Lydia Epley was a coworker with whom I was 
23 placed to a supervisory position." 
24 Did you supervise her? 
25 A No. 
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Taylor vs. Epky Depo: Lydla Inez Carrlllo Epiay (5-20-07) 
1 A it's not his. I know it's not hia. 
2 Q But you didnt sign his name to it? 
3 A I didn't 
4 Q Do you know who did? 
5 A Somaona, but I dont know. Ihadaomaona 
6 aign it, but I dont know who It was. 
7 Q You aakad aomaona to a4gn Max's nama to It? 
8 A Or It could ba mlna. I don't know. Imaanl 
9 could havaalgnad It or I could hava aakad aomaona to 
10 sign it I dont know. 
11 Q That was to facilitate the loan? 
12 A No, that wasn't That waa to add mora Income 
13 for ma aa - 1 maan -
14 Q To qualify lor tha loan? 
15 A Yes, exactly. 
16 Q Now, in thte lawsuit there is a judgraem that 
17 was obtalnad against you in favor of Yvonne, Pat, and 
18 Alex. You'ra awara of that? 
19 A Oh, yaa, I am. 
20 Q And la It accurate to say that tha antira 
21 amount of that judgmant la ovar $81,000? 
22 A Trtat*e what they have, but I guess there's -
23 thara'a punitive and othar damages. I dont know. 
24 Q I'm handing you -
25 A I dont know what thay want 
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1 (Dafandant OCWEN'a Exhibit 15 markad 
2 forldaiitffication.) 
I 3 Q BY MR. ANDERSON: I'm handing you Exhibit 15, 
I 4 whichiaanordarand|udgmantantaradinthtscasa. 
I 5 A Yes, I hava a copy. 
I 6 Q And according to that document, what la tha 
I 7 amount of Judgmant? 
I 8 A Tha amount of tha Judgmant is $81,079.83. 
I 9 Q And when was it entered? What's tha date K 
I 10 waa aignad by tha fudge? 
I 11 A I dont hava a data on hare. I dont hava a 
I 12 Judga'a-1 dont hava a judga'a signature or data on 
I 13 hare. 
I 14 Q Look at the teat page. 
I 15 MR. MARSH: If s a Wank copy. 
I 16 MR. ANDERSON: Oh, is It? Apparently that*a 
I 17 unaignad. 
I 18 Q Hava you aaan a aignad varaton? 
I 19 A No,lhawrt. 
I 20 Q In connactionwnh that (udgment, your wagaa 
I 21 are preaanttybalng garnished by your brother and 
I 22 aisters? 
23 A Yes. 
I 24 Q And how often do thay do that? 
I 25 A Every pay day, avary Friday, tomorrow la pay 
I 
1 day and there will ba a garnishment on It 
2 Q And how much la each garnishment? 
3 A Twenty-five percent of my earnings. 
4 Q So approxlrnater/how much per pay period? 
5 A Well, on a 40-hour pay period I think It'a 
6 $214 or $208. In tha summer I put in a lot of overtime, 
7 ar*H think ~ two weaks ag^ FrMay my last paycheck^ 
8 hax!39houreofovartinia,andlthinkthaytook300and 
9 aoffiathing. I hava the check stub. 
10 Q How much hava thay garnished to data ainca 
11 the judgment waa entered? 
12 A A years'worth of wages. I couldnttellyou 
13 how much, but a years' worth of wagaa. 
14 Q Ovar $5,000? 
15 A H that's what ft adds up to, that's what it 
16 could ba. 
17 Q Do you know where that money's going? 
18 A I thought It waa going to pay tha houaa 
19 payment 
20 Q Tha-
21 A Tha-
22 Q Tha loan? 
23 A Tha Provo residence, yaa. 
24 Q Thought It waa going to Berkeley or OCWEN? 
25 A Yes, I did. 
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1 Q Or whoever heW that loan? 
2 A Yaa, I did. 
3 Q Did your brother or aiatere ever tall you 
4 thet? 
5 A I dont talk to them. IJust assumed that 
6 Thaifa what I assumed they took the Judgment for waa to 
7 pay tha houaa payments. 
8 Q Do you have amy idaa what the fair market 
9 valua of tha Provo residence is today? 
10 A NoJoWt 
11 Q You dont know If It'a Incraasad In value? 
12 A IckMrt. 
13 Q Haaany probata bean commenced in connaction 
14 with tha Provo property? 
15 A As far as I know, no, but I dont know. I 
16 mea<ilhavenotaciuawhat'agoingonwithlt 
17 Q You're not being consulted Hit is? 
18 A Exactly. Since I've aignad tha quit cteim 
19 daad ovar to them, I'm -tha only thing that they're 
20 concerning ma with anything is tha garntehmant 
21 Everything etee I dont know. 
22 Q And whan you daadad tha property back to them 
23 4tthacourihouaa,tharewMftoreductkMof 
24 amount? 
25 A No, there waanX 
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1 MR. ANDERSON: ThaTe all I have for now. 
2 THE WITNESS: Do you want thasabadc? 
3 MR. MARSH: I've got a law questions. Idoot 
4 know HyouYe got any. 
5 MR. BROWN: No. 
6 MR. ANDERSON: HoWon. Mr. Mafmh ia going to ask 
7 soma follow-up questions. 
8 
9 EXAMINATION 
10 BY MR. MARSH: 
11 Q Talking about that Exhibit 14, you've said 
12 that Aiax did not sign that but you think mayba aomabody 
13 alsadid? 
14 A Oh, I kiiow someone else did, becauee I called 
15 JannteandltoWhsrthatl-youknow.lcouldnnflnd 
16 Mm or gat a hold of Mm to eignit, and that's whan aha 
17 taxed m« this paper right h«rs(liKlteatif>g) and saW to 
18 ask John or somebody else to sign it; so I did. 
19 Q JohnRtsser? 
20 A Rissar, yes. 
21 Q This is Jam! at CFC that asked you to find 
22 John or somebody else to sign It? 
23 A Yes. 
24 Q And did you find somebody else to sign it? 
25 A Either I found someone else to sign It or I 
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1 signed It myself. 
2 Q Ami that was at the request otJsmi at CFC? 
3 A Yea. I have the paperwork right hare. 
4 Q But she knew that you couldn't find Alex to 
5 sign It? 
6 A No, aha didirt. No. We never talked about 
7 IL 
8 Q But I thought you fust said that she-that 
9 you had told her you coukmt find Alex. 
10 A Yes. And she aeked me If I would either have 
11 John or someone else sign It, and nothing was said attar 
12 that There was a signed ~s signed paper on tt. And 
13 she didn't ask me, -Well, did you find your brother, did 
14 you have someone elee sign IT. She didnl say anything. 
15 Q But sriedM ask you to have John or somebody 
16 else sign It lor Alex? 
17 A Yea. 
18 Q And you did that? 
19 A YesJdTd. 
20 MR. ANDERSON: Just interject 
21 For Alex or for themselves as a potential 
22 tenant? 
23 THE WITNESS: For me to have the income of $800 to 
24 qualify for the loan. 
25 Ma ANDERSON: I understand. If you got John to 
151 
1 sign it, would you understand John would sign his own 
2 name as the tenant or ha would forge Alex's name as the 
3 tenant? 
4 THE WITNESS: He would forge Alex'a name to do It, 
5 butJohndidntdolt I know that for a fact He 
6 dWnl want to have anything to do with It Either I dW 
7 It or I had someone else sign It 
8 Q BY MR. MARSH: You mentioned, Lydla, that you 
9 signed your dad's name to everything when he was stJU 
10 alive, with his permission. I think those ware your 
11 words. I may be mistaken. 
12 A No,ldWnT I mean like -
13 Q DW you sign lots ot things for him with his 
14 permission? 
15 A Oh, yes, I did. 
16 Q How many things; can you remember? 
17 A 20,30,40,50. Since I was 18, 
18 Q Do you remember what some otthoeetMngs 
19 might have bean? 
20 A Money orders, Ma CFW updating, Ma CFW card, 
21 his Eegles papers to get Into the Eagles. Just stuff he 
22 didnl want to deal with I did. 
23 Q And you dW that at his request? 
24 A Yes, I did. 
25 Q AiKltfa* was Wnd ots regular thing In those 
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1 last years; was trot correct? 
2 A In the past from the time -from 1973 to 
3 1994, yes. 
4 Q Okay. And did you feel like you had your 
5 father's permission to sign tMngs for Mm? 
6 A I did have Ma permission to sign tMngs for 
7 Mm up until the day he died. 
8 Q Did you have thM in mind when you made the 
9 decision to sign your fathers name to the trust 
10 agreement? 
11 A Yes, I did. 
12 Q West your intent when you eigned that trust 
13 egreemeMreailytoiustmafcearecordof adocumeMthat 
14 you already knew had been signed by Mm? 
15 A Yes, It was. 
16 Q That was be<»use the original couldn't be 
17 found? 
18 A Exactly. 
19 Q So m doing that you had no intent to cheat 
20 anybody? 
21 A At the time, no, I didnX And then when I 
22 found out how much trouble I waam because I owed so 
23 many peopieaiid I waatuad of getting im^ 
24 my wages garnished, I did It butthetwae my only-at 
25 that time I thought that was my only way out 
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